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Abstract
Nakamoto consensus, the protocol underlying Bitcoin, has the po-
tential to secure a new class of systems which agree on non-mathematical
truths. As an example of this capability, we propose a design for a
trustless, data availability oracle. This exposition reduces the problem
of determining whether or not a registered datum is publicly available
to the problem of constructing a network in which either almost all
nodes can download a given datum, or almost none of them can.
1 Silo effect
Traditional blockchains, like Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [5], live a lonely life.
By design, miners, which constitute the “eyes and ears” of each network,
have no formal means to reach consensus about external events. While
Oraclize [10] and Reality Keys [12] successfully pipe Internet information
into Ethereum, their bridges rely on trusted authorities. These efficient,
oracle methods, and even aggregating methods like Chainlink [2] suffice for
many applications, however they also introduce central failure points in
Ethereum’s otherwise autonomous, reputationless system.
Unstoppable, decentralized applications, such as the original Livepeer
protocol [8] demand not only trustless computation oracles, like TrueBit [16],
but also un-erasable data storage. Ethereum provides scarce but immutable
“on-chain” storage, however prohibitive expense limits on-chain storage to
only the most laconic of messages. Ethereum’s security depends on every
miner storing every byte of blockchain data until the end of time, hence
∗This version, updated in 2019, includes minor changes, and corrections.
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substantive data uploads on this system remain unwieldy. Moreover, prop-
agating more than a little data in each block could induce rational miners
to skip block verification and even break the underlying consensus, a phe-
nomenon known as the Verifier’s Dilemma [18]. Indeed, rational miners
might not wait for downloads. We therefore consider off-chain alternatives.
We set ourselves the task of constructing a trustless oracle which can
confirm off-chain data availability. This use case fundamentally differs from
that of traditional, cloud storage platforms, such as Dropbox [3], Storj [14],
Sia [13], and Maidsafe [9], which place users in control of the data that
they upload. Dropbox, in particular, allows uploaders to decide whether
and when to share their data with others. In a data availability scenario,
on the other hand, disappearance of data can destroy high-stakes financial
transactions as well as critical computations. The network must therefore
counteract users’ incentives to pretend that they have “published” data.
For illustration, a Bitcoin transaction should not magically disappear after
the system confirms its funds as spent, and neither should the input for a
TrueBit computation vanish before the system has had time to process it.
To distinguish the present approach from existing projects like File-
coin [6] and Swarm [15], we explicitly isolate the data availability problem
from other commonly associated concepts such as data sharding, privacy,
computation, scalability, and Ethereum. We aim for a dead simple, modu-
lar design which is amenable to a clean and rigorous security analysis.
Overview of technical contributions. Under the peer-to-peer network
assumptions of Section 3, the proposed construction in Section 4 achieves
a trustless, Nakamoto-based system which correctly reports on whether or
not registered data are available during a given epoch. Our construction
maintains integrity without resorting to either distinguished nodes or a rep-
utation scheme. Any anonymous node can participate in the system with a
deposit, and like Bitcoin, security improves as more honest and rational min-
ers nodes join the network. The main idea is straightforward: use Nakamoto
consensus [21] to create a report of what’s available and what isn’t.
In the present system, every functioning Miner node stores and prop-
agates each and every registered datum. We do not attempt to “shard”
data among various parties. Rather than attempting an infinitely scalable
solution, we instead content ourselves with designing a system where each
node securely stores some orders of magnitude more data than “on-chain”
storage permits. Unlike a blockchain, which permanently stores all data
forever, the present system releases data after its registration period ends,
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hence its storage space is reusable. We shall further explore scaling methods
in Section 6.
Building on an independent blockchain offers some flexibility over Ether-
eum. As noted earlier, Ethereum has limited storage space and its miners do
not see external inputs. Thus our data availability system requires some con-
sensus beyond Ethereum mining. Other approaches to trusted data feeds
include data attestation via trusted hardware [23] and, since the original
publication of this manuscript, decentralized, on-chain voting via smart con-
tracts [17, 20].
2 Warm-up: fiat-crypto exchange rates
Verifying an Ethereum transaction amounts to checking signatures, logical
conditions, and self-evident mathematical truths. Thus Ethereum miners,
who are tasked with verifying these transactions, need only pay attention
to local announcements on the blockchain. One can, however, imagine that
miners could agree on other kinds of objective, global facts, whose validity
depends on time. In this section, we outline a simple “consensus com-
puter” [18] application which extends beyond agreement on mathematical
facts.
Consider the following concrete example. Some decentralized applica-
tions require a bound on the exchange rate between a stable, fiat currency
and a native, cryptocurrency token. Since miners in traditional blockchains
do not observe fiat exchanges, some other mechanism must necessarily feed
this information to the blockchain. Rather than relying on an authority,
Teutsch and Reitwießner proposed to use a blockchain consensus protocol
to agree on external exchange costs [22, Section 5.5]. We shall now ex-
trapolate on this idea and then, in Section 4, transmogrify it into a data
availability protocol.
Network nodes agree on exchange rates using a variant of Nakamoto con-
sensus [21], the protocol underlying Bitcoin. Rather than collating financial
transactions into blocks, each Miner simply includes, in addition to a proof-
of-work, the delimiters of a real interval allegedly containing the value of the
current exchange rate. A block, then, is valid if both the proof-of-work is
correct and its interval contains the true exchange rate accepted by a ma-
jority of other Miners. By convention, Miners keep an eye on real exchange
rates and mine on top of blocks they perceive as valid.
How large should the exchange rate interval be? While in general, Miners
might be able to agree, say, that the price of an ether lies between 650 and
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700 USD, during moments of wild volatility or low liquidity, the market may
not afford such precision. For this reason, each Miner independently chooses
the size of of the interval and receives a block reward inversely related to the
size of the interval. Smaller intervals have higher reward potential, however
they also have a greater chance of being ignored by Miners who may perceive
the associated block as invalid.
3 The consistency problem
Let us now return to our original problem. We seek a decentralized system
which correctly reports on data availability. Our consensus protocol con-
struction hinges on the following crucial assumption about the underlying
peer-to-peer network.
Consistency Axiom. Either almost all nodes in the network can download
a given datum, or almost none of them can.
The World Wide Web, for example, largely exhibits this property. Either
the website truebit.io is “up” and everyone in the world can see it, or else
most people agree that the site is “down” regardless of their Internet access
point. For the purpose of this exposition, we shall assume that a peer-to-
peer network exists and exhibits this desired consistency property. We shall
not concern ourselves here with the construction of the peer-to-peer layer
but rather explore a cryptoeconomic structure on top of it.
The Consistency Axiom above permits us to make the following well-
defined notion.
Definition 1. Let x be a datum. If most nodes can see x, then x is publicly
available. If few nodes can see x, then x is not publicly available.
Due to the gap afforded by the Consistency Axiom, the above definition
covers all possible cases for all data. We now introduce a secondary network
assumption.
Upload Axiom. Any computer can join the network and, with high prob-
ability, propagate data into a publicly available state.
Without the Upload Axiom, our Consistency Axiom might vacuously
describe a network without any nodes. A new upload need not become in-
stantly available, however we shall assume a bounded lag on its propagation.
We conclude this discussion with one final requirement.
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Directory Axiom. Nodes can efficiently determine whether or a datum x
is publicly available from hash(x). If x is available, then hash(x) tells where
to download x.
Thus any node which wishes to upload or download a publicly available
datum can use the datum’s hash as a directory. The IPFS [7] filesystem, for
example, satisfies the Directory Axiom. Aside from exceptions described in
Section 5, the system relies on Nakamoto consensus for security.
4 A consensus protocol for data availability
Under the axioms of Section 3, we now devise a decentralized system which
indicates whether or not a registered datum is publicly available. We assume
familiarity with Nakamoto consensus [21]. The network consists of two types
of parties: Storers who wish to provably publish data and Miners who both
confirm and guarantee availability of data. Let c be the network lag time,
or number of blocks to confirm a storage request for a datum and propagate
it through the network. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that this
time bound suffices for all datums, regardless of size. The Upload Axiom
from Section 3 now allows us to introduce the following upload interface.
Storer interface. A Storer who wishes to publish a datum x broadcasts a
registration of x to the network consisting of the following components:
1. hash(x) which, by the Directory Axiom, doubles as an address
for downloads,
2. the number of block epochs for which x should be publicly avail-
able (excluding network lag time c), and
3. a reporting fee payable to Miners based on the size of x and the
registration duration specified in item 2.
We say that datum x is registered at time t if the blockchain contains
a registration for x that persists at block epoch t. Note that registered
data may or may not be publicly available. The Storer must propagate
his registered datum, lest the network report it as unavailable.
Definition 2. A report, denoted R(x), is a formal, plaintext assertion
that datum x is publicly available. A Miner who includes R(x) in the
tth block signals that, “datum x is publicly available in both block
epochs t and t + 1.” A set of reports S in block t is called complete
if for every registered datum x, R(x) ∈ S if and only if x is publicly
available in block epochs t and t+ 1.
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Using Definition 2, we shall obligate each Miner who propagates a block
claiming that x is publicly available at time t to further ensure that x remains
available at time t+ 1. We shall assume that a single miner propagating x
suffices to make the datum publicly available, hence an honest Miner can
always ensure R(x) holds and guarantee herself a block reward. See “Space
economy” in Section 5 for further details.
Miner interface. Any Miner who wishes to join the network first identifies
the “longest” blockchain, namely the one containing the greatest proof-
of-work [21]. The miner obtains the longest blockchain from peer nodes
and retraces it from its genesis block, observing each Storer transaction
along the way in sequence, and noting which Storer requests are still
registered at the present moment. The Miner attempts to download,
store, and propagate all currently registered data. The Miner locally
considers any data successfully downloaded to be publicly available.
She can determine validity of the current header block valid, according
to the criteria below, after silently observing the chain for c epochs.
We assume that the initial, altrustic Miners in the system converge to a
consistent world view during the first c blocks following the consensus
genesis.
Definition 3. A valid block at time t consists of the following ele-
ments:
1. the complete set of reports at time t (taking into consideration
network lag time c),
2. a collection of new, cryptographically signed Storer requests, and
3. a value nonce witnessing a proof-of-work. More specifically, the
concatenation of the following components must hash to a small
value:
(a) the mining nonce [21],
(b) items 1. and 2. above.
(c) a private key at which to receive the block reward and net-
work fees, and
(d) the hash of the previous block header.
Main Loop. The protocol steps for the Miner now roughly follow
Nakamoto consensus [21].
1. In each block epoch, the first miner to find a valid block broad-
casts it to the network and receives a block reward plus applicable
reporting fees.
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2. Upon verifying a new valid block, each Miner downloads, stores,
and propagates all data registrations contained in the new block.
The Miner locally considers any data successfully downloaded to
be publicly available and propagates the data as expediently as
possible.
3. The mining race begins anew on top of the new block.
Miners always mine on the “longest” chain whose most recent c blocks
are all valid. “Longest” here formally means the chain with the great-
est proof-of-work, since block difficulty may change over time. Miners
need not store data which ceases to maintain registered status.
Unlike Bitcoin, the present blockchain construction has no notion of va-
lidity for individual “transactions.” Indeed reports are only valid as sets.
We remark that the validity of a block also depends on time because data
presence can vary. We thus realize a powerful application of the consensus
computer [18] which both requires and permits agreement on facts external
to mathematics.
5 Security analysis
In this section, we argue that the blockchain construction in Section 4 accu-
rately reports data availability. More specifically, we argue that a report for
a registered datum x appears in the tth block if and only if x was publicly
available during the tth block epoch. In other words, the system records
both when a registered datum is publicly available and when it isn’t. The
“Main Loop” in Section 4 dictates that Miners always broadcast valid blocks
consisting of complete reports. The security doubts we must resolve in order
to establish our desired property above are twofold:
1. Can rational Miners and Storers gain by deviating from the consensus
protocol?
2. Does the consensus withstand peer-to-peer layer failures?
We shall assume that an adversary of the first type wishes to either:
1a) convene a published report that some datum was publicly available
when it actually wasn’t, or
1b) receive a block reward without actually committing resources to the
network.
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Nakamoto consensus largely inhibits attacks of types 1a) and 1b). The
Consistency Axiom permits us to circumvent potential attack vectors of
the second type, however precise protocol adaptations for handling these
attacks depends on the specific implementation of the underlying peer-to-
peer network. It remains a crucial open problem to design and construct a
peer-to-peer layer satisfying the three axioms in Section 3.
Data withholding. A Storer who registers a datum x could potentially
take any of the following actions:
1. neglect to publish x itself,
2. delay his public reveal of x until the final moments of c-block propa-
gation period, or
3. publish x at first but then hide this datum from the network.
In case 1, Miners never see x, unless it was otherwise publicly available, and
hence they never report x in a block. Since the blockchain witnesses no
report of x as publicly available, this type 1a) attack fails. Cases 2 and 3
do not impact functionality of the network, care of the Consistency Axiom.
Indeed, either x becomes publicly available, in which case most Miners would
report it as such, or else it would not be publicly available, in which case
they would not. Miners have incentive to propagate data (Section 4), which
reduces the chances that x could transition from publicly available to not
publicly available during its registration period. In short, the Storer cannot
incite a fallacious or controversial report on the blockchain.
Space economy. Although the consensus protocol in Section 4 obligates
Miners to store and propagate data, a Miner might neglect this obligation in
attempt to conserve resources in accordance with attack type 1b). A Miner
who fails to upload and propagate publicly available data risks orphaning
his block as other Miners who cannot access x may perceive the block as
invalid. Similarly, the Miner who mines the subsequent block at time t+ 1
bears responsibility for the availability of x until the next block epoch t +
2. This overlapping storage requirement reinforces the Consistency Axiom
by incentivizing Miners to download and propagate all registered, publicly
available data. Indeed, a Miner who witnesses but does not propagate data
must rely on the faithfulness of other anonymous Miners and Storers to
maintain validity of her reports in the successive mining race.
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We remark that with some small probability, a Miner may not be able
to see a publicly available datum and therefore might unknowingly prop-
agate an invalid block. This invalid block would then not be accepted
by other Miners, who have the “true” world view. As in Bitcoin, timely,
well-intentioned blocks occasionally “uncle,” or never reach the blockchain.
Confirmed reports, however, remain consistent with publicly available data
because the majority of Miners share correct perceptions.
Mining pools. Miners often share computing resources and block rewards
via pools in order to collectively reduce income variance. The pool operator,
who coordinates a pool’s cooperation efforts, typically chooses the reports
for all members in the pool. Under such circumstances, pool members would
rely on their pool operator to determine whether a datum is publicly avail-
able, thereby reducing the total number of eyes on the peer-to-peer network
and weakening consistency. A simple solution is to require all mining pool
members to choose their own reports rather than relying on operators for
selection. To this end, the underlying consensus mechanism could, for ex-
ample, mandate universal participation in SmartPool [19].
6 Scalable implementation
How much data could a system like the one proposed here actually mon-
itor in practice? While the actual capacity depends on the structure of
the underlying peer-to-peer network, the present storage mechanism clearly
has some finite limit for the same reasons that Bitcoin and Ethereum have
bounded transaction volumes [18]. The finite limit of this system should,
however, greatly exceed what the system could securely store directly on the
blockchain itself. What about more storage — does this construction scale?
Fortunately, two independent storage systems can store twice as much as a
single one!
In theory, one can store an unlimited amount of data through system
replications, however, if one wishes to use the availability of data in some
root system, such as Ethereum, the root system’s underlying consensus pro-
tocol must keep an eye on each individual, data availability system. Suppose
that a Task Giver in TrueBit [22] were to provide a computational task whose
off-chain input Solvers and Verifiers could not see (i.e. they witness only a
hash on-chain). Then the Task Giver could potentially provide a bogus
solution to his own task, and neither Solvers nor Verifiers would have any
recourse to object against the data unavailability unless the authoritative
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Judges, or miners, collectively expand their myopic, on-chain, world view.
Finally, we remark that maintaining the same level of proof-of-work secu-
rity on two independent blockchains requires twice as much mining resources
as a single blockchain. Thus a hierarchical system such as Plasma [11], in
which the integrity of each child blockchain relies on proper function of its
parent, could provide a useful scaling model for data availability. Each leaf
in Plasma’s blockchain hierarchy would manage a modest amount of data,
while the root system would only monitor data availability disputes for es-
calated situations.
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Andreas Veneris for useful comments
which are reflected in the updated version.
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